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Abstract— The aim of quantum cryptography is to overcome 
the everlasting problem of unrestricted security in private 
communication. The usage of the quantum principles protects 
the privacy of the user data during the time it is in the 
transmission process over the telecommunication channels. The 
sophisticated algorithm we have developed will make the data 
meaningless to eavesdroppers. The security of modern 
cryptographic systems has been accomplished by using a long 
key that will require many years to launch a brute force attack. 
Therefore, we designed an efficient algorithm that is developed 
based on BB84 and B92 techniques. In this paper, we utilized the 
classic features of quantum mechanism, such as superposition 
and uncertainty principle. We present the underlining 
mechanisms of quantum cryptography that enhances the security 
of data transmission in three stages with valid results that 
promise a low rate of errors that leads to a strong consistent key 
by raising the constraint of the security concept. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The revolution of Quantum mechanism occurred early in 
the 20th century.  Therefore, every time we use electronics 
devices or transmit and receive information unconsciously, we 
utilize our knowledge of the nature of quantum.  Yet, in 
information, technology there is still enough room for 
developing quantum properties [1].  During the early 80, 
scientists have acknowledged quantum aspects as a supply for 
identifying with protocols banned by traditional laws of 
physics.  Furthermore, in modern computers, the increase in 
performances goes hand in hand with decrease in size. 
Consequently, more rapidly, a single transistor will be so 
modest that it will be essential to account for quantum effects 
to understand fully and to predict decisively its behavior [2]. 
The theory of quantum cryptography was developed in 
1984 (BB84) by Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard as part 
of a research study between physics and information at IBM. It 
was known at that time as quantum distribution scheme [1].  
The fundamental concept of the quantum system relies on 
the distribution of single particles or photons and the value of a 
classical bit encodes by the polarization of a photon [2]. 
Actually, the quantum cryptography is based on two important 
elements of quantum mechanics: The Heisenberg Uncertainty 
principle and the principle of photon polarization. Based on 
physical law, a photon is an elementary particle of light 
carrying a fixed amount of energy, light may be polarized; 
polarization is a physical property that comes forward when 
light is observed as an electromagnetic wave [3]. The direction 
of a photon’s polarization can be fixed to any desired angle 
(using a polarizing filter) and can be measured using a calcite 
crystal. 
II. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
While genuine algorithms have fulfilled the markets for a 
practical secure system, the search for a provable secure 
algorithm is still searched by scientists. Furthermore, security 
of RSA, the mainly used crypto protocol today, resides on the 
not disproven fact that no efficient factorization algorithm that 
is able to break it in logical times is known.  
We now know that if quantum computers will be ever 
available, RSA could be broken by Shor’s quantum Algorithm 
[4] a quantum computer could factorize large numbers in a 
very efficient manner exploiting entangled states. The open 
traditional problem was essentially the key distribution 
process.  Identical shared keys will be given to Alice and Bob 
by QC protocol. Then to categorize the approximate 
communication error level, the two parties have to compare 
their strings [5]. The third party Eve interceptions could be the 
reasons for the error, channel flaws (as losses) and detectors’ 
inefficiencies and/or dark counts, to make it more difficult to 
differentiate among these types of errors is physically 
impossible. For that reason, we assume all the errors are due to 
eavesdropping.  QC tries to answer the following question: Is it 
actually possible to produce and distribute a sequence of truly 
strings random numbers of bits to form a shared trusted key in 
a provably secure way? 
III. RELATED WORK
The Heisenberg Uncertainty principle states that, it is not 
possible to measure the quantum state of any system without 
disturbing that system. This means that polarization of a 
photon or light particle can only be known at the point when it 
is measured [9]. This principle plays an important role in 
preventing the attempts of eavesdroppers in a cryptosystem 
based on quantum cryptography [6].  
Secondly, the photon polarization principle explains how 
light photons can be polarized in a specific direction. In 
addition, an eavesdropper cannot copy unknown qubits i.e. 
unknown quantum states, due to the no-cloning theorem which 
was first presented by [8] in 1982. The quantum cryptography 
allows a bit string to be agreed between two communications 
parties without having two parties to meet face to face, and yet 
these two parties can be sure with a high confidence that the 
agreed bit string is exclusively shared between them. 
A. One Time Pad 
In cryptography, a one-time pad (OTP) is an encryption 
technique that cannot be broken if used correctly [10]. In this 
technique, a plaintext is paired with a random, secret key (or 
pad). Then, each bit or character of the plaintext is encrypted 
by combining it with the corresponding bit or character from 
the pad using modular addition [4]. If the key is truly random 
and at least as long as the plaintext and never reused in whole 
or in part and kept completely secret, the resulting cipher text 
will be impossible to decrypt or break [7]. It has also been 
proven that any cipher with the perfect secrecy property must 
use keys with effectively the same requirements as OTP keys. 
However, practical problems have prevented one-time pads 
from being widely used. 
Despite Shannon's proof of its security, the one-time pad 
has serious weakness in practice; it requires perfectly 
unpredictable random one-time pad numbers, which is a non-
trivial software requirement [5]. 
 Secure generation and exchange of the one-time pad 
material must be at least as long as the message [9].  The 
security of the one-time pad is only as secure as the security of 
the one-time pad key-exchange. Careful treatment must make 
sure that it continues to remain secret from any adversary 
Key distribution is needed bcause the pad, like all shared 
secrets, must be passed and kept secure, and the pad has to be 
at least as long as the message, once a very long pad has been 
securely sent (e.g., a computer disk full of random data), it can 
be used for numerous future messages until the sum of their 
sizes equals the size of the pad [12]. Quantum key distribution 
also proposes a solution to this problem. 
Distributing very long one-time pad keys [11] is inconvenient 
and usually poses a significant security risk. The pad is 
essentially the encryption key but unlike keys for modern 
ciphers, it must be extremely long and is much too difficult for 
humans to remember [8]. Storage media such as thumb drives, 
DVD-Rs, or personal digital audio players can be used to carry 
a very large one-time-pad from place to place in a non-
suspicious way, but even so the need to transport the pad 
physically is a burden compared to the key negotiation 
protocols of a modern public-key cryptosystem. Finally, the 
effort needed to manage one-time pad key material scales very 
badly for large networks of communicants [7]. 
The number of pads required increase as the square of the 
number of user’s increase freely exchanging messages. For 
communication between only two persons or a star network 
topology, this is less of a problem [14]. 
The key material must be securely disposed of after use to 
ensure that key material is never reused and to protect the 
messages sent. Because the key material must be transported 
from one endpoint to another and persist until the message is 
sent or received, it can be more vulnerable to forensic 
recovery than the transient plaintext it protects [13]. 
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography came to use thousands of years ago, and 
since then, it has been constantly developing along with 
human civilization [11]. The significantly influenced 
human society and some time even the course of history. 
Today cryptography has become important technology in 
the internet society that each individual relies on [9]. 
One typical example is the RSA [7] crypto scheme; it is 
often used in online shopping: The net shop   prepares a 
public key containing the product (N) of p and q prime 
numbers. A net shop published this product (N) for its 
customers and keeps the values of p and q secret [8]. 
The costumers encrypted their credit card information 
with the purchase information with public key and sent 
the encrypted data to the net shop; the net shop derives 
the private key from the two primes by simple calculation 
to decrypt this data [10]. Let us assume the malicious 
hacker knows the public key but has no idea of the private 
key. For decryption, the hacker needs to factorize (n) to 
find the prime p and q. The factorization of this prime 
numbers is a time consuming task when (n) is large [8]. 
In the end of the last century, it was said even the most 
powerful computer would take thousands of years to 
factorize 200 digit numbers [12]. Since then rapid 
progress has been made in both software and hardware. 
In December 2009, an international team of researchers 
succeeded in cracking 786-bit RSA key in only two years 
using a novel encryption algorithm and cluster of personal 
computers [15]. If military intelligence had a method of 
breaking longer keys, it would never announce this fact. 
For this reason, RSA scheme today employs a public key 
with at least 1024-bit key. 
In recent years, the fiber tapping device [13] became 
available in the market, making it easy for hacker to tap 
signal for a fiber. It has been actually reported that fiber 
networks in some U.S. investment firms and Frankfort 
airport were intercepted in the past. Therefore, encryption 
is necessary to guarantee safe transmission to sensitive 
data.   
A. BB84 
  The first QKD protocol was introduced in 1984 [6], labeled 
as BB84. It used two polarization bases, rectilinear (R) basis 
and diagonal (D) basis, and the single photon that may be 
polarized with four states:  |h›, |v› |lcp›, and |rcp›. Polarization 
state |h› (|v›) in R-basis reveals “0” (“1”) and polarization 
state |lcp› (|rcp›) in D-basis reveals “0” (“1”). The italic letters 
h mean horizontal, v vertical, lcp left circle polarized, and rcp 
right circle polarizes [10]. 
Alice and Bob would like to send an encrypted message to 
each other so their message securely can be made private [12]. 
To do this, they need a cryptographic key that is only known 
to them that they will use to encrypt their message [15]. In 
addition, there is Eve; she tries to intercept their message, 
BB84 will allow them to come up with secret key both can use 
and trust. 
To follow the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob need to use two 
communication channels [11], classical channel and quantum 
channel. The classical channel allows them to send individual 
bits of information back and forth. As the bits travel among 
the classical channel, it is possible for Eve to intercept them. 
Eve can observe the bits and send a copy of them to their 
regular destination. When communicating through a classical 
channel, Alice and bob have no way to detect Eve. 
The quantum channel [8] behaves differently. Instead of 
transferring bit, it transfers qubits. The qubits represent bit, 
and either of two processes can generate them. Let us call 
them (A) and (B).  The BB84 takes advantage of some 
properties of qubits.  Qubits cannot be copied and it is not 
possible to determine whether if qubits were generated by 
process (A) or (B). When qubits represent zero in machine 
(A), it will produce a zero and when qubits represent one, the 
machine will produce one [10]. In both cases the qubits will be 
destroyed in the process, on the other hand, if machine (A) is 
fed with qubits that were produced by machine (B), the output 
will be randomly half the time is zero and half the time is one, 
and the qubits is still be destroyed [9]. Likewise, a special 
machine exists to observe qubits produced by process (B). Let 
us call it machine (B). When it gives qubits produced by 
process (B), a machine (B) will out put the correct bit, but 
when is fed a qubits produced by process (A), machine (B) 
output will be random and just as machine (A) qubits will be 
destroyed. Therefore, when Bob receives a qubit over the 
quantum channel, he will not know which machine to use to 
observe it. He will decide by a coin toss [5]. Half the time he 
will feed qubits to machine (A) and half the time, he will feed 
it to machine (B) [9]. 
The protocol began [11] when Alice sent Bob a very large 
number of qubits over the quantum channel. Bob recorded all 
the output he received as he fed the qubits randomly to his 
qubits measuring machine. He will pick the right machine half 
the time; an average 50 percent of his measuring will be 
correct for the remaining qubits. He will still end up half the 
time just by chance. This means 75% of Bob measurement 
will be correct [5].  
      However, if Eve intercepted [9] the qubits before they 
reach Bob, she will also need to make random guesses as to 
which machine to use. Thus because Eve intercepted half of 
the qubits, therefore half of the qubits she will send to Bob. 
Half has been generated correctly and half of them incorrectly 
[5]. This means only 75% of the qubits that will reach Bob 
will represent what Alice intended [9]. Now when Bob 
receives the qubits, he will have to make random guesses. This 
will give Bob a new accuracy of 62.5%. Bob however does 
not know that yet, so he and Alice will have to communicate 
some information to each other to work out what accuracy 
Bob is getting. Once Bob finished measuring all the qubits he 
received, he will open the classical channel and send Alice a 
stream of bits that indicates to her which machines he used to 
measure each of her qubits. Once she received that message 
from Bob, she will review the personal record and send to Bob 
telling him which of the qubits he ended up measuring 
correctly [11]. Now Bob can throw away the wrong qubits and 
Alice can do the same.  Now they are in possession of a string 
of bits that is only known to them and no one else. 
If the observation accuracy [10] is below 100%, they will 
know Eve intercepted some of their Qubits and the 
communication is not secure. Proved that Eve was attempting 
to confound their effort, they should now be in possession of 
string of bits that is known only to them. They have very large 
sequence of bits so they can afford to sacrifice a random 
subset of them in order to determine whether Eve was 
listening to them over the classical channel [7]. They need to 
choose a subset of bits and compare them, and if they are 
satisfied they are secure, then they can use the reaming bit to 
form a secret cryptographic key. If they observe an accuracy 
of 100 %, they can be reasonably confident that their share 
key is secure. Now they can use them to encrypt further 
communications, using this protocol allow Alice and Bob to 
generate a cryptographic key and they can determine whether 
secrecy has been compromised or not. 
Table 1.A 8-bit sample of Alice (A) and Bob (B) for BB84 
Sequence of 
bits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A’s bit 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
A’s source 
basis 
D R R D R D D D 
A’s 
polarization 
|rc
p› 
|h› |v› |lcp› |h› |rcp› |lcp› |lcp› 
B’s detector 
basis 
D D D R R D R D 
B’s 
measuremen
t 
|rc
p› 
|rc
p› 
|lcp› |v› |h› |rcp› |h› |lcp› 
B’s bit 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
A’s response Y N N N Y Y N Y 
Shared 
secret key 
1 _ _ _ 0 1 _ 0 
B. Protocol B92 
     In the B92 protocol [4], two states can be regarded as 
“half” of the BB84 protocol. Alice and Bob first have to agree 
that Alice uses |h›-photon and |rcp›-photon to represent “0” 
and “1”. Bob uses |lcp›-basis and |v›-basis as “0” and “1”. 
Table 1 and Table 2 show BB84 and B92 in detail. 
 Based on B92 only two states are more important than the 
possible four polarization states in BB84 protocol [16], and 
this is the main difference in B92. “0” can be encoded as “0” 
degree in the (R) rectilinear basis and “1” can be encoded by 
“45” degrees in the diagonal basis (D). Just like the BB84, 
Alice transmits to Bob a random string of photons encoded 
with randomly chosen bits, however now, Alice dictates which 
bases she must use [1]. Bob still randomly chooses a basis by 
which to measure, but if he chooses the wrong basis, he will 
not measure anything (a condition in quantum mechanics that 
is known as an erasure). Bob can simply tell Alice after each 
bit she sends whether or not he measured it correctly. 
Table 2.A 8-bit sample of Alice (A) and Bob (B) for B92 
Sequence of 
bits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Alice’s bit 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
A’s 
polarization 
|rcp› |rcp› |h› |h› |rcp› |h› |h› |rcp› 
B’s detector |lcp› |v› |v› |v› |lcp› |lcp› |v› |lcp› 
Bob’s bit 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Bob 
measurement 
N Y N N N Y N N 
Shared secret 
key 
_ 1 _ _ _ 0 _ _ 
For instant, in Table 2, only two bits are shared by Alice and 
Bob (2,  6) as the secret key, the efficiency is 2/8= 25%. 
For protocol B92 [4, 17, 18], the ideal efficiency is 25%. To 
analyze the +efficiency in properly way is shown in Figure 2. 
Assume that Alice sent |h›-photon, i.e., “0” (Figure 2(a)). Bob 
will choose randomly |lcp› -basis or |v›-basis. If Bob selects 
the wrong basis, i.e., |v›-basis, he cannot detect the photon. If 
Bob selects the correct basis, i.e., |lcp›-basis, he has 50% 
probability to detect the photon; however, even if he chooses 
the correct basis, he still has the probability of 50%. Finally, 
Bob will have idealized maximum efficiency of 25% to share 
the correct bits [16, 17, 18]. 
V. PROPOSAL ALGORITHM TO IMPROVE SECURITY 
In this protocol, we introduced the three stages process. The 
first stage convention is similar to the BB84 protocol. Alice 
will choose random strings bits through the four bases 
according to the BB84 protocol and send them to Bob through 
Quantum channel. Bits “0” can be encoded as |v› state in (R) 
basis and as |lcp› degrees in the (D) basis and bits “1” can be 
encoded as |v› state in (R) and |rcp› (D) basis [11]. 
A. In the first stage Bob will make his guess and use random 
basis to measure Alice’s Qubits; then Bob will open a 
classical channel to communicate with Alice and announce 
what basis he used to measure his bits. Alice will compare 
their bases and find out which is the wrong measurement 
and then discard the wrong basis from the strings that she 
received from Bob, and she will save what resulted from 
this process. 
a) In the second stage Alice will repeat the first step
again and generate another random sequence of
photon using the same polarization basis from stage
one and send it to Bob through quantum channel.
b) Bob will detect each photon that is represented in the
binary sequence using random basis from |lcp›, |rcp›-
basis or |h›, |v›-basis to measure Alice string.
c) Alice and Bob will share the results of Bob’s
measurement through classical channel. Alice will
analyze Bob’s result and proceed to the final stage.
d) Alice compares both Bob’s result with her string, and
discards the correct matched Bob’s result from his
measurement.
e) Finally, Alice will combine the first stage result and
second stage result string together to generate the
final shared secret key. It will be a strong
sophisticated key that will provide more security and
reliability to their information transaction.
These key will be developed from the result of deriving the 
two keys represented as one strong Encryption key, so both 
user can use now to transmit their data safely. 
First stage for producing the key works exactly according to 
BB84 protocol 
Table 3.A 8-bit sample of Alice (A) and Bob (b) 1st stage 
Sequence of 
bits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A’s bit 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
A’s basis D D R D R D R R 
A’s 
polarization 
|rcp› |lcp› |v› |rcp› |h› |rcp› |h› |v› 
B’s detector R D R R R D D D 
B’s 
measurement 
|h› |lcp› |v› |h› |h› |rcp› |rcp› |lcp› 
Bob’s bit 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Bob reports 
basis 
R D R R R D D D 
A’s response N Y Y N Y Y N N 
1st shared 
secret key 
_ 0 1 _ 0 1 _ _ 
B. The Second stage for producing the secret key 
Alice will generate another random string through the 
quantum channel to Bob. Bob will measure the string 
randomly and compare his measured bits through classic 
channel with Alice. Alice here will discard the correct basis 
that is matched Bob’s measurement from her string. 
C. The Third stage Alice will compare both keys from first 
and second stage together and combine them as one strong 
secret key that will be used to transfer data between both 
parties through the classic channel. 
Table 3.B 8-bit sample of Alice (A) and Bob (b) 2nd stage 
Sequence of 
bits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A’s bit 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
A’s basis D R D R R R R D 
A’s 
polarization  
|lcp› |h› |rcp› |h› |v› |v› |v› |lcp› 
B’s detector  D R D R R D R D 
B’s 
measurement 
|lcp› |v› |lcp› |h› |v› |rcp› |h› |lcp› 
Bob’s bit 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Bob reports D R D R R D R D 
A’s response N Y Y N N Y Y N 
2nd Shared 
secret key 
_ 1 0 _ _ 1 1 _ 
Final stage to combine 1st and 2nd secret key to finalized the 
shared secret key. 
Table 3.C 8-bit sample of Alice (A) and Bob (b) final stage 
1st  key 0 _ 1 0 1 _ _ _ _ 
2nd  key _ 1 0 _ _ 1 _ 1 _ 
Final 
Shared 
Secret 
key 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 _ 
VI. ANALYSIS
In figure 3.A, if Bob chooses the correct basis, he will detect 
the correct polarized photon. However, if Bob chooses the 
wrong basis, he knows that his result is inconclusive. 
Therefore, the idealized maximum efficiency is 50% for 
BB84. It also shows that Alice used R-basis sending |h›-
photon and |v›-photon. In B92, the efficiencies are 25% and 
for BB84 its 50% and this is the price that two QKD protocol 
must pay for secrecy. Here we proposed two-way transmission 
over the quantum channel (Alice →Bob and Alice→ Bob) 
instead of one-way transmission. Our enhanced QKD protocol 
has three stages. In the first stage, Alice sends random 
sequence of photon according to BB84; in the second stage 
Alice will use a modified version of BB84 to send another 
large sequence of photon, and in the final stage Alice will 
generate a cryptography key that resulted from previous 
stages. 
     Our enhanced protocol enhances the efficiency to 43.8% 
with the average complexity order 2.76 when using BB84 in 
the first stage. In addition, when using the modified version in 
the second stage the idealized maximum efficiency can reach 
28.9% with average complexity of 2.4. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Quantum cryptography is a fascinating illustration; the 
uncertainty principle imposes restrictions on the capacity of 
certain types of communication channels. It is not possible for 
hackers to determine whether the qubits were generated by R-
basis or D-basis. Furthermore, by taking advantages of 
transmitting the qubits over the quantum channel, that will 
increase the security by developing strong cryptographic key 
and use it to exchange data between two parties. However, in 
our proposed protocol, we take advantages of the properties of 
quantum qubits twice to generate a secret key that can be 
generated without any interference from an eavesdropper. By 
increasing the restriction of the security. Therefore, we 
develop a strong reliable key by adding more security 
demands without being worrying about any guesses from 
intruder who might be present. Even if the guess of the 
attacker in the first case was 25%, we enforced this error to be 
decreased to 15% to 18%. This is because of` the principles of 
quantum mechanics that ensure that no eavesdropper can 
successfully measure the quantum state while it is being 
transmitted without disturbing the state in some detectable 
way. Using this protocol allows Alice and Bob to generate 
secure a cryptographic key, and they can determine whether or 
not their secrecy has been compromised. 
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